Geopolitics of Rare Earth Elements: China’s Dominance, Defence Applications and Strategic Measures
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31305/ijmds.v15n09.004Keywords:
Rare Earth Elements, Weaponisation of Trade, Geopolitics, GeoeconomicsAbstract
In the global economy, Rare Earth Elements (REEs) are playing a strategic role in advanced technologies, clean energy, modern industries, and defence equipment. Despite being abundant on earth’s crust, the difficult process of their extraction from rare earth ores to pure individual elements are making them ‘rare’. For the last few decades, China has enjoyed monopoly power in rare earth refining and processing, which China further uses as a strategic weapon against heavily import-dependent countries such as the US and Japan. This study aims to discuss about rare earth applications in defence, China’s dominance over the REE market, how it affects the heavily import-dependent countries’ defence sector (national security) and economy, and what measures are taken by them to reduce import dependency. The study reviewed existing literature and took the latest data on rare earth mine production and rare earth reserves from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) to provide better clarity about rare earth supply. It finds that any disruptions in their supply chain can directly affect the country's defence sector and national security, which heavily rely on rare earths. Supply diversification measures taken by import-dependent countries can partially reduce their dependency on China, but can’t completely diversify their supply from China.
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